Success in "intentionally homeless" appeal  

Susan Dodd v Crewe and Nantwich Borough Council

Chester County Court, HHJ Clarke, 26.08.2005

Case summary

A possession order was granted against the Appellant based on 4 admissions of anti-social behaviour by her children. In granting possession the trial judge said that the children "could have been avoided" and "could have been controlled". The Appellant went to live with her mother and applied for assistance under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 to Wulvern Housing (who owned the property following a large scale transfer of the Council's housing stock). They decided that the Appellant was intentionally homeless. She applied for a review that was carried out by the Council. On review the original decision was upheld on two main grounds. Firstly, that the court process had already established that the Appellant was responsible for her children and the judge had found that she could have controlled her children. Secondly, that the Appellant had not done all that she could have done to remedy the behaviour of her children.

On appeal under section 204 His Honour Judge Clarke found that the reviewing officer had misdirected herself in law. Under section 191 a person can only be intentionally homeless if she deliberately does or fails to do anything in consequence of which she loses her accommodation that was reasonable for to continue to occupy. The word "deliberately" was of the utmost importance. This was not a case where the Appellant had deliberately done anything herself which caused the loss of her home. Further, in relation to the question whether she had deliberately failed to do anything, the correct test was not the same as that applied by the court in a claim for possession. The mere failure to control children who caused anti-social behaviour could not give rise to a finding that she had deliberately failed to do anything in consequence of which that person lost their accommodation. In this case the Appellant had cooperated and engaged with all relevant agencies. The reviewing officer decided that the Appellant had not done all she could reasonably have done but failed to identify what she had deliberately failed to do or even could have done. In the circumstances and after considering the decision of Griffiths v. St Helens MBC the decision was set aside and remitted to a different reviewing officer for a further review. The Council were ordered to pay the Appellant's costs.

Martha Unwin, Shelter, Chester; Adam Fullwood , Barrister, Manchester.